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CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
CARY COGLIANESE†
ABSTRACT
Administrative law scholars and governmental reformers argue
that advances in information technology will greatly expand public
participation in regulatory policymaking. They claim that erulemaking, or the application of new technology to administrative
rulemaking, promises to transform a previously insulated process into
one in which ordinary citizens regularly provide input. With the
federal government having implemented several e-rulemaking
initiatives in recent years, we can now begin to assess whether such a
transformation is in the works—or even on the horizon. This paper
compares empirical observations on citizen participation in the past,
before e-rulemaking, with more recent data on citizen participation
after the introduction of various types of technological innovations.
Contrary to prevailing predictions, empirical research shows that erulemaking makes little difference: citizen input remains typically
sparse, notwithstanding the relative ease with which individuals can
now learn about and comment on regulatory proposals. These
findings indicate that the more significant barriers to citizen
participation are cognitive and motivational. Even with e-rulemaking,
it takes a high level of technical sophistication to understand and
comment on regulatory proceedings. Moreover, even though
information technology lowers the absolute cost of submitting
comments to regulatory agencies, it also dramatically decreases the
costs of a wide variety of entertainment and commercial activities that
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are much more appealing to most citizens. Given persistent
opportunity costs and other barriers to citizen participation, even
future e-rulemaking efforts appear unlikely to lead to a participatory
revolution, but instead can be expected generally to deliver much the
same level of citizen involvement in the regulatory process.

E-rulemaking seems to be the next “best thing” capturing the
attention of administrative law scholars. For a time, negotiated
rulemaking had been the reigning “best thing,” promising to cure the
ills thought to afflict a time-consuming and conflict-ridden regulatory
process.1 But even after Congress passed a statute encouraging the
2
use of negotiated rulemaking and a number of agencies tried to use
3
the procedure, interest generally faded as empirical research showed
that formal negotiation of rules makes little difference, or certainly
4
fails to accomplish anything like what proponents had promised.

1. The seminal article advocating the use of negotiated rulemaking is Philip J. Harter,
Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982).
2. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (2000).
3. For case discussions of specific negotiated rulemakings, see, for example, Charles C.
Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and Implementing
Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 149
(1999) (analyzing and assessing the potential of negotiation in the formulation and
implementation of environmental and health and safety policy); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1627–29 (1986) (reviewing
negotiations over rules at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Federal
Aviation Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency).
4. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1259–61 (1997) [hereinafter Coglianese, Assessing Consensus]
(reporting empirical results showing the failure of negotiated rulemaking to achieve its major
goals of reducing rulemaking time and decreasing judicial challenges); Steven J. Balla & John R.
Wright, Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes to Develop Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY,
AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 187, 203–05
(George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003) (reporting empirical results that negotiated
rulemaking does not shorten the time to develop rules). One empirical study reports that
negotiated rules appear to be rated better by participants than conventionally developed rules.
Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule
Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
599, 600 (2000). The Langbein and Kerwin study, however, suffers from substantial conceptual
and methodological shortcomings. See Cary Coglianese, Is Satisfaction Success? Evaluating
Public Participation in Regulatory Policymaking, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 69, 78 (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa Bingham eds.,
2003) [hereinafter Coglianese, Is Satisfaction Success?] (discussing limitations of the Langbein
and Kerwin study and others that rely on satisfaction as basis for evaluation); Cary Coglianese,
Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 430–38 (2001)
[hereinafter Coglianese, Assessing Advocacy] (discussing problems and limitations of the
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Experience with other regulatory reforms has exhibited a similar
pattern of initial high hopes followed by a failure to deliver on
5
reformers’ expectations.
Is e-rulemaking headed down the same path? At the very least, it
is starting out in much the same place. Reformers promise great
things from the application of new information technology to the
regulatory process—chief among them being the ability to expand
public participation in rulemaking. Prior to the advent of modern
information technology, unelected regulatory officials made
significant policy decisions through a process largely insulated from
the general public.6 Information technology is now supposed to make
it easier for ordinary citizens to learn about, participate in, and
7
influence governmental decisionmaking about new regulations.
The Clinton administration first trumpeted e-rulemaking as a
8
means of enhancing citizen participation, and the Bush

Langbein and Kerwin study). For discussion of further concerns with negotiated rulemaking, see
Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 93, 93–94 (Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Coglianese, Consensus].
5. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Laurie K. Allen, Building Sector-Based Consensus: A
Review of the US EPA’s Common Sense Initiative, in INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 65, 65
(Theo J.N.M. de Bruijn & Vicki Norberg-Bohm eds., 2005) (finding that a major EPA effort to
reform environmental regulation produced nothing of consequence); Cary Coglianese,
Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1119–25 (2002) (noting
the persistence of inefficient regulation even following procedural reforms designed to improve
the efficiency of government rulemaking).
6. Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Regulatory Process,
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 372 (2004).
7. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 438 (2004) (“Regulatory agencies are
increasingly harnessing the power of digital technologies to . . . expand public involvement in
policymaking.”).
8. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER &
COSTS LESS: IMPROVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS 39 (1993), available at http://govinfo.library.
unt.edu/npr/library/reports/reg04.html (recommending that agencies “[i]ncrease [their] use of
information technology,” as this would, among other things, “give the public easier and more
meaningful access to rulemaking and policy guidance documents”); OFFICE OF THE VICE
PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, CREATING
A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS: REENGINEERING THROUGH
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 25, 28 (1993), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/
library/reports/it03.html (recommending the use of information technology “to reduce the
complexities that citizens face” and improve “[c]itizen access to government information and
services”); HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., ELECTRONIC DOCKETS: USE OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
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9
administration has picked up the tune with still greater gusto. Making
e-rulemaking one of its governmental reform priorities, the Bush
administration moved swiftly to implement a one-stop Web portal,
Regulations.gov, that allows citizens to comment more easily on any
proposed rule issued by any federal agency.10 The Bush
administration has also created an online docket system intended
eventually to house all rulemaking records across the entire federal
government.11 Commenting on the launch of Regulations.gov in 2003,
the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) said,
“[E-rulemaking] will democratize an often closed process and enable
every interested citizen to participate in shaping the rules which affect
us all.”12 With similar optimism, the managers implementing the
administration’s e-rulemaking initiative have declared the project to

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1995), available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/classes/
rstaudt/internetlaw/casebook/electronic_dockets.htm (discussing technical and legal issues
related to improving public access to the regulatory process through e-rulemaking).
9. See, e.g., Press Release, Executive Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
OMB Accelerates Effort to Open Fed. Regulatory Process to Citizens and Small Businesses
(May 6, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2002-27.pdf (explaining
the Bush administration’s effort to make the “regulatory process more open to the public”
through online rulemaking).
10. For an overview of the Bush administration’s e-rulemaking initiative, including
descriptions of the federal docket management system and progress with Regulations.gov, see
Michael Herz, Rulemaking, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
PRACTICE, 2002–2003, at 129, 145–51 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2004).
11. For commentary on the new federal docket management system (FDMS), including
recommendations of ways to enhance access to information for research, see Cary Coglianese et
al., Unifying Rulemaking Information: Recommendations for the New Federal Docket
Management System, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 621, 622 (2005). The Bush administration’s program to
create a government-wide docket system has met with bumps along the way, including funding
conflicts with congressional appropriators. See Cindy Skrzycki, Funds for E-Docket Filed Under
‘No,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at D1 (reporting that the House Appropriations subcommittee
refused to allow the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to require agency contributions
for the development of the FDMS until the OMB submitted a detailed funding plan). The
administration, however, continues to promise that the “FDMS will ultimately replace the 20
existing individual agency electronic regulatory systems and over 150 paper-based docket
systems.” EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS OF THE PRESIDENT’S E-GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES 3 (2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/e-gov/e-gov_benefits_report_2006.pdf
[hereinafter E-GOVERNMENT BENEFITS].
12. Press Release, Executive Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
Regulations.Gov to Transform U.S. Rulemaking Process and Save Nearly $100 Million (Jan. 23,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/2003-03.pdf. Three years later, the
Bush administration continued to proclaim that “Regulations.gov and the Federal FDMS
effectively promote a key principle of E-Democracy—using information technology to enable
all citizens to more effectively participate in their government.” E-GOVERNMENT BENEFITS,
supra note 11, at 3.

02__COGLIANESE.DOC

2006]

10/4/2006 1:09 PM

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN RULEMAKING

947

be “a groundbreaking achievement on the road toward citizen13
centered government.”
Administrative law scholars similarly predict grand effects from
e-rulemaking. One of the earliest administrative law articles on erulemaking claims that the Internet will “change[] everything,”
helping to ensure that “[c]itizens can . . . play a more central role in
14
the development of new agency policies and rules.” Another legal
scholar suggests that the federal e-rulemaking initiative holds the
potential to “enlarge significantly a genuine public sphere in which
individual citizens participate directly to help . . . make government
decisions.”15 Still another describes the Bush administration’s erulemaking effort as “perhaps the most far-reaching and important
16
such governmental transformation ever effected.” In this vein, a
13.

Oscar Morales & John Moses, eRulemaking’s Federal Docket Management System, in
CROSSROADS (Stuart Shulman ed., May 4, 2006), available at
http://erulemaking.ucsur.pitt.edu/doc/Crossroads.pdf. The members of an awards committee at
the John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Innovations in American Government program
apparently agreed, naming the Bush administration’s e-rulemaking initiative as an award finalist
in 2005 and again as one of the top fifty most innovative government programs in the United
States in 2006. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Celebrating Our Success: Office of
Environmental Information FY 2005 Accomplishments 20 (Nov. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oei/pdf/2005_oei_accomp_rep_final.pdf; Harvard University, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, and The Council for Excellence in Government, The
Innovations in American Government Awards: 2006 Top 50 Programs 2 (Mar. 22, 2006),
available
at
http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/redir.html?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.
ashinstitute.harvard.edu%2FAsh%2F2006IAGtop50.pdf. In announcing its 2006 decision, the
innovations award program declared that the administration’s e-rulemaking initiative
“promotes e-democracy and opens the door to the Federal rulemaking process by placing
hundreds of regulations and supporting documents that impact daily life at the American
public’s fingertips.” Id.
14. Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
277, 277, 303 (1998).
15. Peter M. Shane, Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic
Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy, 1 I/S 147,
148 (2005), available at http://www.is-journal.org/V01I01/I-S,%20V01-I01-P147,%20Shane.pdf;
see also Coglianese, supra note 6, at 373 (reporting on an e-rulemaking workshop at which
“[m]any participants were convinced that [information technology] would lead to a dramatic
increase in the number of comments submitted on agency rules”); Lobel, supra note 7, at 440
(“The new portals for notice and comment help make the public comment process more
interactive and deliberative. This . . . increases public participation and democratic legitimacy.”)
(footnote omitted).
16. Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
434 (2004) [hereinafter Noveck, Electronic Revolution]. But see Beth Simone Noveck, Public
Participation in Electronic Rulemaking: Electronic Democracy or Notice-and-Spam?, ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2004, at 7 [hereinafter Noveck, Notice-and-Spam] (“The current plan for erulemaking is nothing short of a disaster.”).
ERULEMAKING AT THE
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number of authors claim that e-rulemaking portends a fundamental
17
transformation, even a revolution, in the regulatory process.
Is a revolution really in the works? To assess e-rulemaking’s
impact and its potential, I begin this Article by reviewing what
researchers have discovered about citizen participation in rulemaking
in the past, before the introduction of e-rulemaking. Then I consider
the empirical research on whether and how citizen participation has
18
changed since the introduction of e-rulemaking. Fortunately, an
interdisciplinary network of researchers has been producing a rapidly
expanding body of research that speaks directly to the question of erulemaking’s impact.19 After examining what the research community

17. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 115, 170 (2004) (noting that “[a]dministrative law . . . stands to be transformed by trends
toward increased openness” fostered by information technology); Noveck, Electronic
Revolution, supra note 16, at 433 (“Informal rulemaking, ‘one of the greatest inventions of
modern government,’ is about to be transformed by the silent revolution of e-government.”
(quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65
(1969)); Noveck, Notice-And-Spam, supra note 16, at 7–8 (“E-rulemaking is potentially
revolutionary because it will demand nothing short of a rethinking of bureaucracy itself and the
role of citizens in it.”); Michael Tonsing, Two Arms! Two Arms! E-Government Is Coming!,
FED. LAW., July 2004, at 19 (“The Electronic Rulemaking Initiative . . . . has dramatically
transformed the federal rulemaking process by enhancing the public’s ability to participate in
regulatory agency decision-making.”). Claims about technology’s revolutionary or
transformative potential also abound in the broader literature on the Internet and
policymaking. See, e.g., Council for Excellence in Government, E-Government: The Next
American Revolution 20 (2001), available at http://www.excelgov.org/admin/FormManager/
filesuploading/bpnt4c.pdf (“The digital revolution already is changing the way that government
does business at the federal, state, and local levels.”). Cf. REED E. HUNDT, YOU SAY YOU
WANT A REVOLUTION: A STORY OF INFORMATION AGE POLITICS (2000) (describing
contemporary politics surrounding the Federal Communications Commission’s policymaking as
novel and revolutionary). For a brief overview of some of the claims of “digital democrats,” who
“argue that web-based participation could be the answer to the decline in social capital and . . .
interest in citizenship,” see Stuart W. Shulman et al., Electronic Rulemaking: A Public
Participation Research Agenda for the Social Sciences, 21 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV. 162, 164
(2003). Consistent with the revolutionary fervor found throughout the literature, Jeffrey
Lubbers has raised a question that is now currently (and quite seriously) on the minds of a
number of administrative law scholars: “Should the Administrative Procedure Act be amended
to reflect the electronic age?” Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Future of Electronic Rulemaking: A
Research Agenda 9 (Regulatory Policy Program, Working Paper RPP-2002-04, 2002), available
at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/research/rpp/RPP-2002-04.pdf.
18. In this Article, I use “e-rulemaking” broadly to mean the use of the Internet and digital
technologies in soliciting public input about rulemaking. The introduction of e-rulemaking is
marked by the increased adoption by federal agencies of the option to submit rulemaking
comments by e-mail in the late 1990s.
19. In 2002, the National Science Foundation (NSF) asked me to convene a series of
workshops aiming, among other things, to build a network of scholars interested in erulemaking from across the fields of the information sciences, social sciences, and law. The NSF
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has learned about the impact of current e-rulemaking efforts, I finally
consider how citizen participation might possibly expand in the future
with new applications of information technology and whether erulemaking might eventually create a true revolution in public
participation in the regulatory process.
Will e-rulemaking actually increase thoughtful citizen
participation in regulatory policymaking? The answer appears to be,
after a careful consideration of the available evidence, decidedly
“no.” Based on the experience to date with several different types of
e-rulemaking projects, no signs of a revolution appear on the horizon.
I. PAST
Back in the “old days,” which really were not that long ago,
anyone submitting public comments to a regulatory agency needed to
read the Federal Register to learn if an agency had issued a proposed
rule and then had to send in comments by mailing a letter before the
close of the comment period. Regulations.gov did not exist, and the
Federal Register was not even available online, so it was not easy for
most people to learn that an agency had proposed a rule that might
be of interest to them.20 Some public libraries across the country
carried the Federal Register, but by the time many libraries received
each issue, catalogued it, and placed it on the library shelves, the
public comment periods for the proposed rules in that issue were well
underway, if not lapsed altogether. Of course, if interested parties
could hire a Washington lawyer or lobbying firm to monitor an
agency’s activities, or if they belonged to a trade association or other
organized interest group, they would be in a much better position to
know when a new rule was in the works. On occasion, the public
might happen to learn of a proposed rule in a media report, but
project resulted in a report synthesizing the views of workshop participants. Coglianese, supra
note 6. It also resulted in a Web site, www.e-rulemaking.org, which catalogs and compiles a
broad range of research studies, government reports, and conference proceedings on erulemaking. This Article draws directly on the growing volume of research focused specifically
on information technology and rulemaking. For other work considering the role of information
technology in politics and policymaking more broadly, see generally BRUCE BIMBER &
RICHARD DAVIS, CAMPAIGNING ONLINE: THE INTERNET IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2003);
RICHARD DAVIS, THE WEB OF POLITICS: THE INTERNET’S IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM (1999); GOVERNANCE.COM: DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
(Elaine Ciulla Kamarck & Joseph S. Nye eds., 2002); DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS
FOR POLITICAL RENEWAL THROUGH THE INTERNET (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
20. Coglianese, supra note 6, at 362–63.
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21
coverage of a new regulation was (and still is) relatively rare. Even
when the media do cover a rule, seldom do their reports provide
enough detail to enable a citizen to know how to submit a public
comment.
Not surprisingly, most rulemakings did not elicit many
comments. For example, in 1989, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) issued a total of seventy-two hazardous waste rules
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), nine
of which the agency considered significant enough to list in its
22
semiannual regulatory agenda. For these significant rules, the agency
received an average of twenty-five comments per rule, whereas the
23
other, less significant rules averaged only six comments per rule.
Researchers have found similar comment levels in studies of other
rules and other agencies. Political scientist Marissa Golden examined
comments submitted on eleven randomly selected regulations
proposed between 1992 and 1994 by the EPA, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).24 The number of
comments submitted on these rules ranged from one to 268, with a
median of twelve comments submitted per rule.25 In another study,
political scientist William West examined comments on forty-two
26
rules completed by fourteen different agencies in 1996. The number
of comments ranged from zero to 2,250, with the median rule
27
garnering only thirty-three comments.

21. On the paucity of media coverage of regulations, see Cary Coglianese & Margaret
Howard, Getting the Message Out: Regulatory Policy and the Press, 3 HARV. INT’L. J. OF
PRESS/POL. 39, 40–41 (1998); John Gravois & Walt Potter, How the Press Misses the Beat:
Reporting on Regulatory Agencies Is a Vast Wasteland, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb.
1982, at 29; Jules Witcover, Washington’s Uncovered Power Centers, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., Mar./Apr. 1972, at 14–19.
22. Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the
Administrative Process 67 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
23. Id.
24. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who
Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 250–64 (1998).
25. Id. at 252.
26. William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 66, 68 (2004).
27. Id. at 79.
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Few of these comments ever came from ordinary citizens. A
study of all the significant EPA hazardous waste rules from 1989 to
1991 found that industry filed nearly 60 percent of all the comments
submitted in these proceedings, whereas individual citizens submitted
28
only about 6 percent. Only about 40 percent of the rulemaking
proceedings received at least one comment from an individual citizen,
whereas 96 percent of them contained at least one comment from a
business firm and 80 percent had at least one comment from a trade
association.29 Of those comments submitted by citizens, most were
only the briefest of letters. Often they were handwritten notes;
sometimes they expressed flippant, derogatory remarks toward the
agency; and sometimes they were obviously cribbed from a grassroots
group’s form letter. Business submissions were consistently longer
and more sophisticated, at times running into the hundreds of pages.30
Other studies have found a similar paucity of participation by
31
ordinary citizens in agency rulemakings. For example, in ten out of
the eleven rules in Professor Golden’s study, not a single ordinary
32
citizen filed a comment. The one exception, in which citizens
submitted 9 percent of the comments, was a HUD rule on housing for

28.
29.
30.

Coglianese, supra note 22, at 48.
Coglianese, supra note 22.
For a similar observation, see WESLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING: A
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 39 n.17 (1986), which recounts
a rulemaking in which “the Utility Water Act Group submitted four bound volumes of
comments totaling more than 500 pages on the powerplant industry rules.” Id.
31. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 134 (3d ed. 1997) (“Many of
those who write to agencies are representatives of interest groups since the technical jargon in
regulations makes them incomprehensible to anyone not expert on the subject.”); MAGAT ET
AL., supra note 30, at 39 (“Most of the comments came from individual firms and trade
associations.”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business?
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 135 (2006)
(“[B]usiness interests typically submit the majority of comments to a given rule.”). As political
scientist E.E. Schattschneider observed nearly fifty years ago, the policymaking process is
dominated by organized interests, and even among organized groups there are many more
corporations and trade associations involved in policymaking than groups representing
individual citizens. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW
OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960). Mancur Olson’s theoretical development of collective
action showed the difficulties that ordinary citizens face in mobilizing to pursue common
interests in the policy process. MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS (1973) (elaborating on the implications of collective action problems for
interest group politics).
32. Golden, supra note 24, at 253–55.
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33

the elderly and disabled. In the three HUD rulemakings that Golden
studied, governmental entities tended to dominate among the
commentators, contributing 75 percent of all the comments
34
submitted. Businesses dominated at the EPA and NHTSA, filing 77
percent of all comments.35 On the basis of data like these, it is difficult
to argue with Golden’s conclusion that “at least in the regulatory
36
arena, there is a striking absence of citizen representation.”
II. PRESENT
In an article published in 2005, administrative law scholar
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar suggests that patterns of participation
may have started to change.37 On the basis of his examination of
comments in three rulemaking proceedings, he concludes that,
“contrary to conventional wisdom, comments from the lay public
make up the vast majority of total comments about some
regulations.”38 Professor Cuéllar is certainly correct that some rules—
like those in his study—do garner a large proportion of comments
33. Id. at 255.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 253–54. Golden did not find, however, that many of the same businesses
participated across the different rulemakings, even for those issued by the same agency. See id.
at 257 (“[E]ach [rulemaking] results in a strikingly different set of participants.”); see also
Coglianese, supra note 22, at 51 (noting that “[b]y far, most groups and individuals participated
infrequently” and that “[o]f the 1,607 participants examined, 87 percent participated in only one
[rule]”).
36. Golden, supra note 24, at 255. Woody Stanley, an official with the Department of
Transportation, has suggested that at least some of the NHTSA rules in Golden’s study may
have in fact garnered citizen comments that were not included in the public docket because
most of them were form letters and postcards that provided the agency with no relevant
information. E-mail from Woody Stanley, Office of Legislative and Government Affairs,
Federal Highway Administration, to Cary Coglianese, Associate Professor of Public Policy and
Chair of the Regulatory Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, (Mar. 16, 2006 13:03 EST).
37. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411 (2005).
38. Id. at 414. The first of these rules was proposed by the Treasury Department in 2002 to
address law enforcement use of private data kept by financial institutions. It garnered a total of
172 comments, 124 (72 percent) of which individual citizens submitted. Id. at 442–43. The
second rule, proposed and finalized in 2003 by the Federal Elections Commission, governed the
financing of political campaigns and party conventions. Id. at 447. About fifteen law firms,
political organizations, and legislators submitted comments on the proposed rule, whereas about
1,100 individual citizens submitted comments. Id. at 448–49. The third rule was proposed by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2001 to change the procedures for licensing nuclear
power plants. Id. at 456. The NRC received over 1,400 comments, 98 percent of which came
from individual citizens. Id.
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from ordinary citizens. Yet that has always been the case. An
especially salient rulemaking would, from time to time, become the
subject of a grassroots mass mail campaign, with a large volume of
39
form letter submissions targeted at an agency. This appears to be
what happened in the three rules in Cuéllar’s study. As with other
highly salient rules in the past, most of the comments in two of his
40
rulemakings were “simple form letters,” and citizen comments in the
other rulemaking were, in Cuéllar’s words, “tremendously
unsophisticated.”41
The fact that all three rules in Professor Cuéllar’s study were
proposed within the last five years—after e-mail communication had
become commonplace—does at least raise the question of whether
the Internet might be leading to a general increase in citizen
commentary. The agencies in Cuéllar’s study, after all, accepted email comments on the specific rules he studied.42 About 98 percent of

39. See Fred Emery & Andrew Emery, A Modest Proposal: Improve E-Rulemaking by
Improving Comments, 31 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 8 (Fall 2005) (“Many agencies were
besieged by comments long before the coining of the phrase e-rulemaking.”); Ioana Munteanu
& J. Woody Stanley, Participation in E-Rulemaking: Evidence from an Agency Electronic
Docket 20–21 (Nov. 1, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (“[T]he DOT
received a large volume of comments by mail, including post cards and form letters, for . . .
controversial rulemakings prior to the introduction of the [electronic docket management
system].”); see also David C. Nixon et al., With Friends Like These: Rule-Making Comment
Submissions to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 59,
64 (2002) (reporting that the twenty-one final rules the Securities and Exchange Commission
promulgated in 1998 elicited over six thousand comments, with “the vast majority of those
comments . . . submitted [by individual investors] in reference to two particular rules”).
Although the U.S. Department of Agriculture allowed email submission of comments on its
proposed organics food labeling rule in the late 1990s, the vast majority of the more than a
quarter million comments came in as postcards, paper letters, or faxes—not e-mails. Stuart W.
Shulman, Democracy and E-Rulemaking: Comparing Traditional vs. Electronic Comment from
a Discursive Democratic Framework C-7 (unpublished manuscript, Jan. 27, 2003); Stuart W.
Shulman, An Experiment in Digital Government at the United States National Organics Program,
20 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 253, 255 (2003).
40. Cuéllar, supra note 37, at 449, 457.
41. Id. at 443. The lack of sophistication to citizen comments is relevant because, based on
standard principles of administrative law, comments are supposed to provide the agency with
information relevant to making rational policy decisions, not serve as a measure of public
opinion. In contrast with legislators, agency officials are neither supposed to nor generally do
use comments to count preferences. Professor Cuéllar’s observations about the sophistication of
the comments in the rules he studied are based on an index of ordinal rankings of each
comment on five qualities, such as the extent to which the comment addressed the underlying
statute or the extent to which it contained well-developed background information. Id.
42. E-mail from Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Associate Professor of Law and Deane F.
Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School, to Cary Coglianese, Associate Professor of
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the comments submitted on one rulemaking and about 80 percent on
43
another came in electronically.
Other recent rulemakings have reportedly generated large
numbers of citizen comments. Over the past few years, revisions to
the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) rules on the
44
concentration of media ownership, an EPA rulemaking on mercury
45
emissions, and the U.S. Forest Service’s rulemaking imposing bans
on road construction in wilderness areas46 have each drawn hundreds
of thousands of comments, most of them submitted electronically. If
rules like these, that garner tens or even hundreds of thousands of
comments, have become more than just a rare event, then perhaps
this is because of e-mail communication and other e-rulemaking
efforts such as the creation of Regulations.gov.
The evidence so far suggests that Regulations.gov has not had
any substantial impact on public participation in rulemaking. In
September 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reported that, at most, a couple hundred comments came in through
47
Regulations.gov during its first five months of operation. According
to the GAO report, only about eight of the 300,000 total comments
submitted to the EPA during this same period, and twenty-one of the
18,000 total comments submitted to the Department of
Transportation (DOT), came in through the Regulations.gov portal.48

Public Policy and Chair of the Regulatory Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, (Nov. 11, 2005 07:17 EST) (on file with author).
43. See id. (noting that 98 percent of the comments on the FEC rule and 80 percent on the
Treasury rule were submitted electronically). Professor Cuéllar notes that the percentage of
comments submitted electronically to the NRC was “somewhat lower.” Id.
44. John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal
Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 980 (2006); JoAnne Holman, Strength in
Numbers? Public Participation in the Media Ownership Proceeding at the Federal
Communication Commission 3 (Aug. 31, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/426/TPRC%206049.pdf.
45. David Schlosberg et al., ‘To Submit a Form or Not to Submit a Form, That Is the
(Real) Question’: Deliberation and Mass Participation in U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking 11 (May
5, 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
46. Stuart W. Shulman et al., Electronic Rulemaking: A Public Participation Research
Agenda for the Social Sciences, 21 SOC. SCI. COMP. REV. 1, 2–3 (2003); Seth Borenstein, Bush
Officials Lift Development Ban on Millions of Acres, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 6, 2005, at A15.
47. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING: EFFORTS TO
FACILITATE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION CAN BE IMPROVED 23 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03901.pdf. The name of the U.S. General Accounting Office
was changed in 2004 to the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
48. Id. at 23–24; Herz, supra note 10, at 147.
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By October 2004, however, an EPA official reported that
Regulations.gov had channeled 9,800 comments to various federal
49
regulatory agencies. Although 9,800 comments is clearly a more
substantial response, it is not immediately obvious how to interpret
this number. Considering that the federal government proposed
about 4,900 rules during this same period,50 total comments submitted
through Regulations.gov amounted to an average of only about two
comments per rule. Moreover, it is indiscernible how many of the
comments submitted through Regulations.gov would have reached
agencies through other channels anyway. On the other hand, it is also
possible that Regulations.gov led more users to find out about rules
open for comment and then to e-mail comments directly to the
agencies, rather than submitting comments through Regulations.gov’s
Web interface.51 More study is needed to determine Regulations.gov’s
impact over the long term; however, the early returns suggest that this
impact has not been anything dramatic.
Even if Regulations.gov has not increased the level of citizen
comments, has the simple ability of citizens to use e-mail contributed
to an increase in public participation in rulemaking? According to
one report, comments filed on DOT rulemakings “soared when
52
electronic submission became routine.” In 1998, the first full year the
DOT placed its regulatory dockets on the Internet, the department
reportedly promulgated 137 rules that garnered a total of 4,341
comments.53 Two years later, in 2000, the DOT reportedly received

49. Rick Otis, Federal eRulemaking Initiative, Presentation at the Meeting of the
American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice 13 (Oct. 21,
2004),
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/rpp/erulemaking/papers_reports/
Otis___eRule_ABA_v3_final_10_21_04.pdf.
50. A search in Westlaw’s database for the Federal Register yielded a result of 4,945
proposed rules published between January 1, 2003 and September 30, 2004.
51. Based on a recent study I conducted, it does appear that Regulations.gov makes it
somewhat easier for users to find materials on proposed regulations available on regulatory
agencies’ Web sites. Cary Coglianese, How Accessible are Online Regulatory Dockets?,
Presentation to the American Bar Association Section on Administrative Law & Regulatory
Practice 10–11, 13 (Oct. 21, 2004), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/rpp/erulemaking/
papers_reports/Coglianese%20ABA%20Presentation.pdf. Whether any increased accessibility
provided by Regulations.gov also leads to an increase in the number of comments submitted
directly to agencies has not been examined.
52. Cindy Skrzycki, U.S. Opens Online Portal to Rulemaking: Web Site Invites Wider
Participation in the Regulatory Process, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2003, at E1.
53. Christine S. Meers, Department of Transportation’s Docket Management System,
http://www.diggov.org/library/library/dgo2001/DGOMAC/MEDIA/MEERS.pdf (last visited
Mar. 4, 2006).
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54
62,944 comments across 99 rules. On average, this is nearly a
twentyfold increase in the number of comments per rule.
Despite this dramatic increase, one needs to know more to
conclude that information technology caused this increase.
Rulemakings were not randomly assigned to an “e-mail group” and a
“non–e-mail group,” so it is possible that DOT’s rulemakings in 2000
were simply more controversial or otherwise more “comment-prone”
55
than the rules it promulgated in 1998. After all, regardless of the
availability of e-mail, rules that are highly salient or that affect an
easily activated professional group will be more likely to generate a
larger quantity of public comments. Of course, such rules also tend to
be relatively rare, and for some agencies they might not even be
issued every year. This means that the existence of even one or two of
these outlier rulemakings in a single year could easily account for a
dramatic increase in total or average participation compared with any
other specific year.56
Several recent studies confirm that most proposed rules still
continue to generate relatively few comments, even after the
introduction of e-mail submissions. Government analysts Ioana
Munteanu and J. Woody Stanley recently studied comments filed in
seventeen randomly selected DOT rulemakings, finding that 83
percent of the total comments came from just a single proceeding, a
rule that affected the mandatory retirement age for commercial
57
airline pilots. Munteanu and Stanley find that “most DOT
rulemaking dockets established after [the introduction of DOT’s
online system in] 1998 continued to receive only a few submissions
during the notice-and-comment period.”58 Professor John de
Figueiredo, in a study published in this symposium issue, analyzes
comments and other filings in FCC proceedings since 1992 and finds

54. Id.; see also Skrzycki, supra note 52, at E1 (“In 1997, the [DOT] got 3,102 public
comments on 155 rules; in 2000, there were 62,944 public comments on 119 rules.”).
55. For background on research designs that permit valid causal inferences, see Coglianese,
supra note 5, at 1116–18. In addition to controlling for the degree of controversy or significance
of rules, one would want to control for any differences in the length of the comment period, for
presumably rules with longer comment periods will garner more comments.
56. When a small number of extreme outliers exist in a sample, the median is usually the
better measure of central tendency than the mean or average, as averages can vary markedly,
especially if there is an extreme outlier. See Coglianese, Assessing Advocacy, supra note 4, at
413 (discussing the properties of averages and their sensitivity to outlying data).
57. Munteanu & Stanley, supra note 39, at 14.
58. Id. at 20.
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that “in 99 percent of dockets, the e-filing option does not seem to
59
cause an increase in individual or interest group participation.” That
said, the FCC’s rulemaking on the concentration in ownership of
media outlets did receive a dramatic spike in comments amounting to
“over twenty times the average number of . . . comments the FCC had
ever received in any single month.”60
In an especially informative study, political scientists Steven
Balla and Benjamin Daniels have conducted research specifically
designed to test whether e-rulemaking has caused an increase in
public comments.61 Their sample consists of over four hundred and
fifty DOT rules, roughly half issued between 1995 and 1997 (before
the introduction of the DOT’s online rulemaking system). The other
half consists of rules promulgated afterwards, between 2001 and 2003.
By explicitly comparing comments before and after the establishment
of DOT’s online system, Balla and Daniels’ analysis better overcomes
the vagaries of small samples and the comparison of just two single
years. They find, perhaps surprisingly, that the levels and patterns of
commenting were basically the same across both sets of rules.62 The
median rulemaking in the 2001–03 period had almost the same
number of comments as the median rulemaking during 1995–97
(thirteen versus twelve, respectively).63 The averages were different
(628 during 2001–03 versus 162 during 1995–97), but only because of
two outlier rulemakings in the 2001–03 period.64 These outliers, as

59. de Figueiredo, supra note 44, at 987.
60. Id. at 980.
61. Steven J. Balla & Benjamin Daniels, Information Technology and Public Commenting
on Agency Regulations 12 (Mar. 14, 2006) (unpublished paper, on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
62. Id. at 11. Balla and Daniels relied principally on the Federal Register preambles for data
on the number of comments filed. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 17 (table 2). The two outlier rules each garnered more than 50,000 comments,
whereas the largest number of comments in any single rulemaking in the earlier period was only
about 14,000. Id. at 10–11. Without these two outlier rules in the sample, the average number of
comments within the later time period would drop from 628 to 64, well below the 162 average
for the pre-electronic period. E-mail from Steven J. Balla, Associate Professor of Political
Science, Public Policy and Public Administration, and International Affairs, George
Washington University, to Cary Coglianese, Associate Professor of Public Policy and Chair of
the Regulatory Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
(May 4, 2006 16:13 EST) (on file with author). Even dropping the two rules having the most
comments in the earlier period—one with about 14,000 comments, the other with about 5,000—
the average number of comments in the earlier period (about 85) is still greater than the average
in the later period sans outliers. Id.
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Balla and Daniels correctly note, “characterize rulemaking as it is
65
practiced only on the rarest of occasions.”

Balla and Daniels did not analyze the number of comments
filed by individual citizens. However, the results of two other
studies shed some light on citizen participation after agencies
allowed e-mail submissions. In a study of nine of the most active
DOT rulemakings in late 1999 and early 2000, researcher
Thomas Beierle reports that in seven of these rules very few
individuals filed comments.66 Almost all the comments in these
seven rulemakings came from “the ‘usual suspects’ of law firms,
industry, trade associations, and consulting firms.”67 Munteanu
and Stanley report that the rules in their study that garnered the
largest citizen input were, as would be expected, those that
received the highest amount of overall comments.68 Given that
such highly salient rules tend to be rare, rules that garner a high
level of citizen input presumably also remain rare.
At present, then, neither agencies’ acceptance of comments by email nor the development of the Regulations.gov portal have led to
any dramatic changes in the general level or quality of public
participation in the rulemaking process. Most rules still garner
relatively few overall comments and even fewer comments from
individual citizens. As in the past, the occasional rulemaking does
continue to attract a large number of citizen comments, but most of
69
these comments remain quite unsophisticated, if not duplicative.

65. Steven J. Balla & Benjamin Daniels, Information Technology and Public Commenting
on Agency Regulations 12 (Apr. 7, 2005) (unpublished paper presented at the Midwest Political
Science Association, on file with the Duke Law Journal). Even for these two outliers, the
overwhelming majority of the comments appear to have been submitted by means other than email. Balla & Daniels, supra note 61, at 13.
66. Thomas C. Beierle, Discussing the Rules: Electronic Rulemaking and Democratic
Deliberation 10 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-22, 2003) [hereinafter
Discussing the Rules], available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-03-2.pdf. Beierle
examined just the rules with the most comments filed. E-mail from Thomas C. Beierle, Fellow,
Resources for the Future, to Cary Coglianese, Associate Professor of Public Policy and Chair of
the Regulatory Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
(Nov. 25, 2005 16:17 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
67. Beierle, Discussing the Rules, supra note 66, at 11.
68. See Munteanu & Stanley, supra note 39, at 26 (“[I]ndividuals were also the
predominant type of commenter to most of the dockets with high public response.”).
69. See Cuéllar, supra note 37, at 443, 449, 457 (commenting on the lack of sophistication
exhibited by most comments filed by individuals); J. Woody Stanley & Christopher Weare, The
Effects of Internet Use on Political Participation: Evidence from an Agency Online Discussion
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According to one recent study of about 500,000 comments submitted
on an especially controversial EPA rule, less than 1 percent of these
70
comments reportedly had anything original to say.
III. FUTURE
Maybe more revolutionary change will come in the future. In the
wake of early reports about the low number of comment submissions
through Regulations.gov, the director of the Bush administration’s
eRulemaking Initiative drew an analogy to online tax filings. He
predicted that citizen use of Regulations.gov will increase over time,
noting that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had remarkably few
users of its online filing system in its first several years of operation,71
even though the system now brings in 65 percent of all tax filings each
year.72
Perhaps use of Regulations.gov will increase with time, but the
analogy to online tax filings is clearly inapt. Citizens already were
filing taxes before the introduction of the IRS’s online system, and
they continue to have a strong reason to do so (given that filing is
mandatory). The IRS’s e-filing system simply makes it easier for tax
filers to do something they would otherwise do. In addition, many
people rely on tax preparers to assist them with their taxes, so the
shift to online filing reflects, in part, the choices of these professionals
rather than a complete groundswell from citizens themselves. None of
these considerations apply to Regulations.gov, which only promises to
Forum, 36 ADMIN. & SOC. 503, 517 (2004) (noting that “the large number of comments [in some
rulemakings] is deceptive” because most submissions are form letters).
70. See Schlosberg et al., supra note 45, at 11, 35 n.35 (noting that the EPA’s major
regulation aimed at addressing mercury levels in the air received only about 4,500 original
comments out of over 490,000 submitted); see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Controlling Power
Plant Emissions: Public Comments, http://www.epa.gov/mercury/control_emissions/comment.
htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (reporting that “[t]here were approximately 4,500 unique
comments submitted” on the mercury rulemaking).
71. Gail Repsher Emery, Government Defends E-Rulemaking, WASH. TECH., Mar. 22,
2004, at 16 (quoting Oscar Morales, Director of the eRulemaking Initiative, as observing that
“[n]ot many folks participated in the first couple of years [of online tax filing], so I’m not really
surprised to see our numbers are low. Use will increase over time.”).
72. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., E-File 7 Percent Ahead of Last Year, IR2005-42 (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=137689,00.html
(reporting that at least fifty-two million filings were submitted online in 2005 and that “[o]verall,
65 percent of all returns were e-filed—up from 60 percent for the same period last year”); Press
Release, Internal Revenue Serv., E-Filing Continues Surge with 10 Percent Jump, IR-2004-32
(Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=121067,00.html
(reporting that at least 37 million filings were submitted online in 2004).
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help those citizens who take it upon themselves to express their
opinion on a proposed regulation. No one should expect
Regulations.gov’s usage to increase at anything near the rate of usage
for the IRS’s system.
Of course, even if Regulations.gov fails to generate a dramatic
change in public participation, it is possible that the government will
73
begin using altogether new online tools. For example, some scholars
have urged agencies to establish interactive, online regulatory
dialogues that would involve the public through chat rooms or
discussion boards.74 Existing software already allows citizens to
interact online with each other and with government officials, as well
as to focus their comments on topics defined by the agencies or the
users.75 Professor Peter Shane has suggested that agencies should
establish a series of “deliberative groups around the country with
access to software for conducting online deliberations” and then
invite these groups, among other things, “to develop deliberative
recommendations concerning issues on the agency’s agenda.”76
Although Shane indicates that agencies are unlikely to implement his
77
suggestions fully, in fact a few agencies have taken steps to use

73. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and
Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 899–901 (2006) (discussing the applicability of online
collaboration and peer rating tools, such as those found at Wikipedia.org and Amazon.com, to
e-rulemaking).
74. See, e.g., Cuéllar, supra note 37, at 491–92 (contemplating that agencies would use
“sophisticated online surveys” to help them get a sense of public opinion); Lobel, supra note 7,
at 440 (“[D]igital technology can further be used to create deliberative forums. Government
agencies could create panels of citizens, like traditional juries, that would advise about
rulemaking.”); Beth Simone Noveck, The Future of Citizen Participation in the Electronic State,
1 I/S 1, 20–21 (2005), available at http://www.is-journal.org/V01I01/I-S,%20V01-I01-P001,%20
Noveck.pdf (“[M]oving rulemaking into cyberspace presents an opportunity to experiment with
. . . new methods of dialogue and decision-making . . . that may now be practicable with
information technology.”); see also Coglianese, supra note 6, at 370 (reporting innovative ideas
that arose at a scholarly workshop, including proposals for digital deliberations and online
hearings); A. Michael Froomkin, Technologies for Democracy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE
PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL RENEWAL THROUGH THE INTERNET, supra note 19, at 3, 9
(discussing alternative technologies for facilitating citizen participation in policymaking).
75. See Noveck, Electronic Revolution, supra note 16, at 502–04 (describing the usefulness
of Unchat, H2O Rotisserie, and software developed by AmericaSpeaks, as well as urging the
development of other software that could potentially be used for deliberation over rulemaking).
76. Shane, supra note 15, at 159. For a similar, non-electronic proposal for deliberation
over rulemaking, see David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Democracy
Index Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (2005).
77. Shane, supra note 15, at 159–60.
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78
online dialogues, at least in limited circumstances. Their experience
offers a glimpse of what the future might hold if agencies go further
down the path urged by proponents of online dialogues.
In 2001, the EPA established a ten-day national online public
dialogue on potential revisions to its longstanding internal policy
document on public involvement in rulemaking, permitting, and other
regulatory processes.79 To help EPA officials determine what kind of
revisions to make, the agency used the Internet to try to engage the
public in the revision process. For each day of the dialogue session,
the EPA posted a new thread on the dialogue Web site and assigned
several participants to serve as discussion leaders.80 In a review of the
dialogue, researcher Thomas Beierle declared it to be a “highly
81
successful” experiment.
Although the EPA’s experiment showed that a regulatory agency
could set up and use an online dialogue system to generate discussion
among people from around the country, it is harder to say whether
the dialogue session resulted in much, if any, improvement to the
normal comment process. The level of participation was rather
modest, certainly relative to the number of people affected by the
EPA’s policies. About 1,200 people signed up to get access to the
82
dialogue, 39 percent of whom turned out to be government officials.
Of those who signed up, 320 participated by posting at least one
83
message. Over the ten-day period, participants contributed a total of

78. See infra notes 79–97 and accompanying text.
79. One may visit the dialogue’s Web site at http://www.network-democracy.org/epapip/welcome.shtml.
80. THOMAS C. BEIERLE, DEMOCRACY ON-LINE: AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL
DIALOGUE ON PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN EPA DECISIONS 17 (2002), available at
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-RPT-demonline.pdf [hereinafter EVALUATION OF THE
NATIONAL DIALOGUE]; see also Thomas C. Beierle, Digital Deliberation: Engaging the Public
Through Online Policy Dialogues, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE, supra note 19, at 155, 162
(discussing the quality of the dialogue).
81. BEIERLE, EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE, supra note 80, at 11. Beierle
did temper his assessment somewhat, noting that “[t]o say that the Dialogue was a success is not
to say that there is no room for improvement.” Id. at 51.
82. Id. at 21. This is not to suggest that there is anything wrong with government officials
participating in such a dialogue, but rather simply to note that not all participants were truly
from the “public.” Even fewer were individual citizens. Among the nongovernmental
participants, a significant portion came from industry and educational institutions. Out of the
320 active participants, “[r]oughly 18% were affiliated with an environmental or community
group or identified themselves as individual citizens.” Id.
83. Overall, about sixty percent of the 320 participants contributed only one or two
messages during the entire dialogue, “many of which were introductions posted during the first
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about 1,200 messages to the site—although a third of these messages
came from those who had been specifically recruited to keep the
84
dialogue going. Only about eighty messages a day came from users
participating on their own initiative, relatively few of whom were
85
ordinary citizens.
A year before the EPA ran its online dialogue, the DOT’s
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) created an
interactive discussion about the development of an agency strategic
plan. From August 2000 through May 2001, the FMCSA allowed
members of the public to submit comments via both a Web-based
86
discussion forum and its traditional, official docket. Neither venue
garnered an enormous number of comments, but the discussion
forum did see greater use: 451 messages appeared in the forum,
compared with 102 comments submitted to the docket.87 Of course,
participants in the online forum tended to submit more than just a
single message. The 116 identifiable participants in the discussion
forum contributed 339 messages (the remaining messages were
submitted anonymously), compared with 100 individuals and
organizations submitting 102 comments to the docket.88 There were
virtually no overlaps in the participants between the two venues,89 so

two days.” Id. at 28. About half of all the comments were contributed by slightly more than 10
percent of the participants. Id. at 26.
84. Id. at 23–29.
85. Although it is difficult to know how to gauge this level of participation, eighty messages
a day for ten days hardly seems like a lot. In one recent year, Congress received an estimated
ninety-four million e-mail messages. Communicating with Capitol Hill: How Technology Is
Changing Information Processes in Congressional Offices, INSIDER’S BULL. (Cong. Mgmt.
Found., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2003, at 1, available at http://capitoladvantage.com/capwiz/pdf/
InsidersBulletin1.pdf. Closer to home, the EPA received an average of about two thousand
formal comments a day on proposed regulations in the first five months of 2003. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 47, at 23–24 (identifying the “more than 300,000
comments received through the agency’s own e-rulemaking Web site and traditional methods”).
On the other hand, as Tom Beierle has noted, eighty comments a day for ten days could be
more than might be received at a typical public meeting. E-mail from Tom Beierle, Ross &
Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd., to Cary Coglianese, Associate Professor of Public
Policy and Chair of the Regulatory Policy Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, (Mar. 17, 2006 11:26 EST) (on file with author).
86. Stanley & Weare, supra note 69, at 511. The Web site containing the discussion forum
also included a link for submitting an online comment to the docket. Id. at 510.
87. Id. at 511.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 513. Stanley and Weare reported that only six individuals both participated in the
discussion forum and submitted comments in the docket, and in five of these cases “the
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by establishing the discussion forum the FMCSA plausibly increased
the level of public involvement in its planning process. One cannot be
confident, though, how large any such increase might have been.
Because the same FMCSA Web site contained links both to the
discussion forum and the online docket submission form, participants
could simply select one versus the other. Had the FMCSA provided
only the docket option, it seems likely that at least some visitors who
selected the forum would have submitted a comment to the docket
instead.90
The types of participants who selected the FMCSA’s discussion
forum did vary from those who selected the docket. Traditional
docket comments tended to be filed by the usual suspects, such as
government officials (37 percent), trade associations (27 percent), and
businesses (14 percent).91 In contrast, the bulk of the comments in the
Web discussion forum came from either commercial truck drivers (20
percent) or other individuals (including anonymous posters) (57
percent).92 In addition, most of the docket participants tended to be
repeat players with the agency (85 percent), whereas very few
participants in the discussion forum could be considered as such (4
percent).93 Along with these differences in participants came
94
differences in the types of issues they raised in the two venues. For
example, issues of regulatory enforcement arose more frequently in

participant simply posted the same comments submitted in the docket to the Web site
discussion.” Id.
90. Stanley, Weare, and Musso claim that “[m]any of these individuals would not ordinarily
participate in FMCSA-sponsored policy-making discussions.” J. Woody Stanley et al.,
Participation, Deliberative Democracy, and the Internet: Lessons from a National Forum on
Commercial Vehicle Safety, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL
RENEWAL THROUGH THE INTERNET, supra note 19, at 167, 176. Although this seems true
enough if the comparison is to FMCSA rulemakings in general, it is not clear whether it applies
in these specific proceedings, because the link to submit comments was located on the same
Web page as the link to the online discussion. Even if the discussion forum had not been
available, presumably some number of drivers motivated enough to find that Web page would
have clicked the box to send in a comment, however terse it might have been.
91. Stanley & Weare, supra note 69, at 512.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 513–14. The dominant participation in the docket by repeat players, and
presumably by better-financed industry groups, could have been due to the fact that they were
more familiar with the normal comment process. It may also have been that these players
understood that “the Web-based discussion did not have the same legal authority as submissions
to the official docket.” Id. at 511.
94. Id. at 514–15. Of course, that there were differences does not mean that the existence
of the discussion board caused them. It is not possible to be sure that these issues would not
have been otherwise raised in the docket, had that been the only participation option available.
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the discussion forum, but the docket comments gave more attention
95
to issues related to safety research and analysis.
If these results at the FMCSA provide any indication of what
might lie ahead, the adoption of new tools might well generate
participation from a small number of citizens who would otherwise
not participate in the normal commenting process, and by extension
might bring somewhat different issues or insights to the attention of
96
agency officials. Even if online discussion forums are used more
frequently, however, it does not seem likely that they will bring about
a major transformation in citizen participation in rulemaking. The
scale of public involvement in these digital dialogues has been quite
modest, and the quality or sophistication of the contributions made
by most citizen participants is also unlikely to increase a great deal,
even with more widespread application of these new tools.97
CONCLUSION
Even after introducing various forms of e-rulemaking, regulatory
agencies continue to garner only the most modest, if not trivial, level
of involvement by ordinary citizens.98 Information technology may
lower the cost of finding out about proposed rules and
communicating with regulatory officials, but the reduction of these
barriers alone is insufficient to induce a substantial fraction of the
citizenry to contribute substantive comments on agencies’ proposed
rules. Even with more sustained efforts to create user-friendly tools
or new efforts to use the Internet to educate citizens about regulation,
there will remain substantial motivational, cognitive, and

95. Id. at 514.
96. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text; see also Cuéllar, supra note 37, at 472–73
(arguing that citizen participants can tend to emphasize subtly different issues than policy
insiders).
97. For discussion of the lack of quality of citizen comments, see STUART W. SHULMAN,
THE INTERNET STILL MIGHT (BUT PROBABLY WON’T) CHANGE EVERYTHING:
STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING 32–33 (2004), available
at http://erulemaking.ucsur.pitt.edu/doc/reports/e-rulemaking_final.pdf. Some have questioned
whether greater participation produces better information. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at
99–102; Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 224–28 (1997).
98. See Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, 1 I/S 33, 52–
54 (2005), available at http://www.is-journal.org/V01I01/I-S,%20V01-I01-P033,%20Coglianese.
pdf (“[E]ven after both Regulations.gov and the new government-wide docketing system are
fully on-line, the core obstacles that keep citizens from participating in rulemaking will still
remain.”).
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informational barriers to citizen participation, making continuity
rather than change the expected result, at least for most
99
rulemakings.
The chief barriers to citizen participation in rulemakings are not
technological ones.100 Participating in a rulemaking requires, at a
minimum, understanding that regulatory agencies make important
decisions affecting citizens’ interests, as well as knowing about
specific agencies and the new rules they propose. Yet regulatory
agencies receive little attention in civics education at nearly every
level, and the media generally neglect regulatory policymaking.101 As
a result, the average citizen, who already shows declining involvement
102
in politics, simply does not know a great deal about regulatory
agencies or the policy issues underlying specific rulemakings. Indeed,
it is almost a given that most citizens will not possess a good
understanding of regulatory policy issues. If Congress delegates
rulemaking authority at least partly because certain issues are so
complex or technical that they require agency expertise, then the
policy issues in rulemakings will tend systematically to be ones that
are harder, rather than easier, for citizens to understand.
Even locating regulatory information on the Internet requires a
degree of sophistication. In the fall of 2004, about two dozen students
at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government participated in a study
to see how easy it would be for reasonably knowledgeable citizens to
103
find information about rules proposed by federal agencies. I gave

99. Continuity may not be such a bad thing. As history demonstrates, revolutions do not
always turn out for the best. With respect to rulemaking, a real revolution in public participation
might have only generated new problems for the regulatory process. Id. at 55–57 (discussing
potential drawbacks to increased public participation in the regulatory process).
100. Engaging Citizens Online for Better Policy-Making, OECD POLICY BRIEF (Org. for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2003, at 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/
idabc/servlets/Doc?id=23278 (“The barriers to greater online citizen engagement in
policymaking are cultural, organisational and constitutional not technological.”); see also JANE
E. FOUNTAIN, BUILDING THE VIRTUAL STATE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 196–98 (2001) (arguing that the major barriers to e-government arise
from organizational and political factors, not technological limitations).
101. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
102. See Coglianese, supra note 98, at 52 (“Engagement in elections . . . has declined since
1960. In 2000, only slightly more than half of the voting age public cast ballots in the presidential
election.”) (footnotes omitted). See generally THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING
VOTER: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (2002) (examining causes of
declining electoral participation).
103. For further discussion of this study, see Cary Coglianese, Weak Democracy, Strong
Information: The Role for Information Technology in the Rulemaking Process, in FROM

02__COGLIANESE.DOC

966

10/4/2006 1:09 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:943

these students information about four rules proposed by the DOT
and the EPA and asked them to find a specific numbered document
in the docket for each rulemaking, thereby simulating the challenge a
typical user might face who wanted to find out more about a
104
proposed rule. Surprisingly, even these graduate students, who were
interested in regulation and adept at using the Internet, had a difficult
105
time locating the right dockets within the time allotted. On average,
the Kennedy School students could find only half of the dockets they
were instructed to locate.106
Motivational barriers are also intertwined with knowledge-based
barriers. If relatively few citizens know about rulemakings or know
how the policy issues addressed in these proceedings can affect their
lives, this will constrain their motivation to get involved in the
rulemaking process. But even when citizens do know about an
upcoming rulemaking and how it might affect their interests, choosing
to participate requires that they overcome the well-known problem of
collective action.107 The Internet notwithstanding, it will remain costly
for a citizen to take the time to learn about a rulemaking proceeding
and submit a comment, at least one with any meaningful substance.
The costs of participation should not be thought of in absolute terms,
but rather as opportunity costs. Even though the Internet can
decrease the cost of submitting a comment to a regulatory agency, it
also dramatically decreases the costs of communicating with friends,
tracking sports results, keeping up with celebrity gossip, or playing
video games. For most people, the entertainment, business, and
recreational opportunities made possible by the Internet will be more
appealing than the opportunity to send in a comment on a proposed
federal regulation. Moreover, even citizens concerned about
regulatory policy could reasonably decide not to participate because

ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT TO INFORMATION GOVERNMENT: GOVERNING IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger & David Lazer eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 22, on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Political scientist James Q. Wilson argues
that the problem of collective action shapes the political environment of regulatory agencies,
and that the distribution of the costs and benefits of regulatory policies explains patterns of
public involvement in the regulatory process. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1982). If these motivational factors are
what matter most, then the political patterns Wilson calls attention to will likely persist, even in
the wake of e-rulemaking.
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their one comment would be unlikely to make much of a difference—
and in many cases, they can simply free ride on the comments
108
submitted by organized interest groups.
It is hard to imagine how information technology could ever
overcome the deep motivational, cognitive, and knowledge-based
chasms that stand in the way of citizen participation in the regulatory
process. The results to date from various applications of e-rulemaking
suggest that these non-technological barriers are real and that
probably the most that can be expected from e-rulemaking in the
future will be incremental changes to the levels and quality of public
participation in rulemaking.109
One of these incremental changes could be marginally increased
participation among groups or individuals who are already highly
motivated and reasonably sophisticated. Participation by members of
professional groups affected by proposed rules may increase, such as

108. The extant political science literature suggests that comments do not generally lead
agencies to make changes in their proposed rules, which supports an assumption that a single
citizen’s comment is not likely to make much of a difference. Golden, supra note 24, at 262;
West, supra note 26, at 71; see Nixon et al., supra note 39 at 64 n.3 (observing that, for SEC
Release 33-7513, the rules never cite an individual’s comments, although 88 percent of comment
letters were sent by individuals). If it is true that most of the influence occurs at the proposal
stage, as many interest group representatives seem to believe, then the entire effort to use
information technology to provide public input on proposed rules may be more symbolic than
real. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW
AND MAKE POLICY 79–80 (3d ed. 2003) (describing how the important action in rulemaking
generally takes place before a rule is proposed); Scott R. Furlong, Interest Group Influence on
Rulemaking, 29 ADMIN. & SOC. 325, 335 (1997) (reporting results from an interest group survey
showing that informal contacts prior to rule proposal are viewed as one of the most effective
means of influencing agencies).
109. Similar conclusions find support in the more general literature on information
technology and political participation. See, e.g., Bruce Bimber, Information and Political
Engagement in America: The Search for Effects of Information Technology at the Individual
Level, 54 POL. RES. Q. 53 (2001) (failing to find that the Internet contributed to any widespread
increase in political engagement); Alice Robbin et al., ICTs and Political Life, 38 ANN. REV.
INFO. SCI. & TECH. 410, 461–64 (2002) (failing to find support for more than “small and
incremental” changes in political participation based on a review of empirical studies of the
effects of information communication technology); Dietram A. Scheufele & Matthew C. Nisbet,
Being a Citizen Online: New Opportunities and Dead Ends, 7 PRESS/POL. 55, 69 (2002) (finding
“that—at this stage of its development—the role of the Internet in promoting active and
informed citizenship is minimal”). But see Lori M. Weber et al., Who Participates and Why? An
Analysis of Citizens on the Internet and the Mass Public, 21 SOC. SCI. COMP. REV. 26, 38 (2003)
(reporting survey findings that suggest “there may be something about Internet participation
that mobilizes citizens into political life,” but noting that “it may also be possible that those
engaged in politics are more likely to use the Internet”).
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110
with pilots or flight attendants participating in FAA proceedings. A
second incremental change may be an amplification of the comment
“bounce” long observed with an especially salient or controversial
rulemaking. Instead of seeing occasional rules receive hundreds or
thousands of comments as in the past, exceptionally salient rules may
more consistently receive tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands
of comments.111 The rare, outlier rule will likely lie somewhere farther
out on the extreme.
For all other agency rules, it appears the future will be little
different from the past and present. Rather than a revolution in
citizen participation, the end result from even ambitious attempts at
e-rulemaking seems likely to turn out much less interesting than the
112
high hopes many now seem to harbor. As we enter what many have
called the information age, decisionmakers should take empirical
research information—not just hopeful thinking—into consideration.
A more evidence-based assessment of e-rulemaking’s prospects can
help policy makers and designers of administrative procedures make
better, more realistic decisions about whether and how to use
information technology in the regulatory process, or whether and how
to change rulemaking procedures in light of new technologies.

110. The large number of commercial drivers who submitted electronic comments to the
FMCSA is another example. See Stanley & Weare, supra note 69, at 512, 517 (showing tables of
the percentage and numbers of comments submitted by different groups, including commercial
drivers). From the standpoint of egalitarianism, perhaps scholars and policymakers should be
concerned if individual professionals—rather than a representative cross section of all individual
citizens—start to make up most of the participants in certain rulemakings. At least such a
possible outcome raises concerns similar to those animating discussion about the so-called
digital divide, or the disparities that exist across different socioeconomic groups in their access
to the Internet.
111. This prediction seems to be borne out to some degree by the Balla and Daniels results.
See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 8–17 and accompanying text; see also Robbin et al., supra note 109, at
461 (noting that much of the early literature on information technology and politics has been
“normative, prescriptive, aspirational, stereotypical, and hyperbolic”).

